Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 88

Issue 3

Article 6

2000

The Future of Kentucky's Punitive Damages Statute and Jural
Rights Jurisprudence: A Call for Separation of Powers
M. Scott McIntyre
University of Kentucky

Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the State and Local Government Law Commons

Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
McIntyre, M. Scott (2000) "The Future of Kentucky's Punitive Damages Statute and Jural Rights
Jurisprudence: A Call for Separation of Powers," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 88: Iss. 3, Article 6.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol88/iss3/6

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact
UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.

The Future of Kentucky's
Punitive Damages Statute

and Jural Rights Jurisprudence:
A Call for Separation of Powers
BY M. SCOTr MCNTYRE*

INTRODUCTION

he recent Kentucky Supreme Court decision in Williams v.
Wilson' struck down portions of Kentucky Revised Statute
section 411.184 (Kentucky's "punitive damages statute"),
holding that they violated the common law jural rights doctrine and were
thus unconstitutional.2 The General Assembly enacted the punitive
damages statute in 1988 in response to the perceived public need for "tort
reform" legislation. The Supreme Court in Williams, however, utilized the
mysterious and controversial jural rights doctrine to find that the General
Assembly exceeded its authority by altering the plaintiffs firmly entrenched common law right to recover punitive damages for gross
negligence.4 The General Assembly had modified the punitive damages
standard of recovery to include only acts of which the defendant had a
"subjective awareness."5 In addition, the legislature changed the plaintiff's
*J.D. expected 2001, University of Kentucky. Special thanks to Mary J.Davis,
Stites and Harbison Professor of Law, University of Kentucky, and Joe C. Savage,
Esq., for help with this Note topic. Thanks also to the author's parents for their
continuing love and support.
'Williams v. Wilson, 972 S.W.2d 260 (Ky. 1998).
2 See id. at 269; see also infra
notes 60-74 and accompanying text (providing
an introductory discussion).
3 See Legislative Research Comm'n, Research Report No. 232, Report of the
Kentucky Insurance Liability Task Force, 20 (1988) [hereinafter LRC Report].
4See Williams, 972 S.W.2d at 268.
'KY. REV.STAT. ANN. [hereinafter K.R.S.] § 411.184(1)(c) (Banks-Baldwin
1999). The common law standard for the awarding of punitive damages, before the
punitive damages statute was enacted, is described in Hortonv. Union Light, Heat
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burden of proof to "clear and convincing evidence," as opposed to the
traditional "preponderance of the evidence" standard.6 The Williams court
left open the question of whether the "clear and convincing evidence"
standard violates the jural rights doctrine as well.'
The legitimacy of ajural rights doctrine is not universally accepted in
Kentucky.' However, if one concludes (as does the most recent majority of
the Kentucky Supreme Court) that the jural rights doctrine has its proper
constitutional place, the next question is how broadly or narrowly it should
be interpreted. In his concurrence inWilliams, then-Chief Justice Stephens
expressed hope that the case would spark a debate on the wisdom of the
jural rights doctrine, before the court altered its powerful stare decisis
effect.9 Justice Stephens was well aware of the "counter-majoritarian

& Power Co., 690 S.W.2d 382, 389 (Ky. 1985). The plaintiff had to prove the
defendant's "evil motive" or a "reckless indifference to the rights of others," or that
the defendant's conduct was "outrageous." Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS
§ 908(2) (1979)).
6
K.R.S. § 411.184(2) (Banks-Baldwin 1999).
7See Williams, 972 S.W.2d at 269; see also discussion
infranotes 176-184 and
accompanying text. The Kentucky Supreme Court may address this issue in
Johnson, recently granted discretionary review. See Farmland Mutual Ins. Co. v.
Johnson, No. 1997-CA-001212-MR, 1998 WIL 720947 (Ky. App. Oct. 16, 1998).
'See Thomas P.Lewis, JuralRights UnderKentucky's Constitution:Realities
Groundedin Myth, 80 KY. L.J. 953 (1991-92). This article has been praised by a
justice of the Kentucky Supreme Court as "well reasoned and well documented."
Williams, 972 S.W.2d at 272 (Cooper, J., dissenting). Its author has been described
as "a preeminent scholar of Kentucky constitutional law." Id. (Cooper, J.,
dissenting). The Lewis article is cited extensively throughout the Williams case and
thus willbe referenced in this Note. It is particularly recommended for its thorough
history of the founders' intent concerning the jural rights doctrine. See id. at 26269.
9 See Williams, 972 S.W. 2d at 269
(Stephens, C.J, concurring) (referring to
stare decisis as "a judicial policy implemented to maintain stability and continuity
in our jurisprudence"). The Kentucky Supreme Court has recently been criticized
for its willingness to reverse itself on the same topic within a short period of time.
See Ronald L. Green, The Kentucky Law Survey: Torts, 86 KY. L.J. 907, 907
(1997-98) (arguing that "[t]he absence of deference to the principle of staredecisis
has resulted in a lack of certainty in the law, making it impossible for practitioners
to advise clients with any certainty, which in turn affects the decision whether to
settle or litigate"). The Williams majority stated that "[p]rinciples of predictability
counsel against such major shifts in the law." Williams, 972 S.W.2d at 267. Justice
Stephens wisely called for a thorough examination ofpriorjural rights precedent,
in order to avoid a series of reversals which would cause a general lack of certainty
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difficulty"1 faced by the court when a decision such as Williams, or any
other ruling based upon the jural rights doctrine, abrogates the will of the
legislature." However, this difficulty is also counterposed with the court's
protection of its legitimacy by refraining from routinely abandoning the
stare decisis effect of decisions based upon the Constitution. 2
This Note explores the clash ofpowers between Kentucky's legislative
and judicial branches, as evidenced by the enactment of the punitive
damages statute, its judicial abrogation in Williams, and the future direction
of the jural rights doctrine. Part I will briefly outline the impetus for "tort
reform" that spurred the Kentucky General Assembly to enact the punitive
damages statute. 3 Part II will examine both the Kentucky Supreme Court's
ruling that the punitive damages statute was unconstitutional and the jural
among current and potential litigants and the legal community. See id. at 269.
10 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (2d ed. 1986).
" For an explanation of the inherent problems faced by courts when invoking
the Constitution to strike down laws, see ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST
DANGEROUS BRANCH 16-17 (1962): "When the Supreme Court declares unconstitutional a legislative act or the action of an elected executive, it thwarts the will
of representatives of the actual people of the here and now; it exercises control, not
in behalf of the prevailing majority, but against it." Bickel then concedes the high
value placed on stability,but concludes that that value is also a countermajoritarian
factor. See id. at 17. Deference to the will of the people on matters of economic
legislation, as evidenced through their elected legislators, has been characteristic
of Supreme Courtjurisprudence since UnitedStatesv. CaroleneProductsCo., 323
U.S. 18 (1944). This deference, of course, does not apply when legislation has "no
rational basis" or amounts to "an arbitrary fiat." Id. at 31-32. The Supreme Court
has held that it is permissible to abolish old common law rights to accomplish any
"permissible legislative object." Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117, 122-23 (1929)
(providing rational basis review to a statute barring automobile passengers from
suing drivers for negligence and holding that the wisdom of legislation is generally
the concern of legislatures, not the courts). As will be shown, the Kentucky courts,
contrary to the Supreme Court's example, provide a heightened version of strict
scrutiny to legislation altering common law rights. The focus of this Note is
whether the Kentucky Constitution justifies such heightened scrutiny. See infra
notes 168-175 and accompanying text.
2
But see Hilen v. Hays, 673 S.W.2d 713, 716 (1984) (holding that the stare
decisis authority on contributory negligence did not prevent the court from
adopting comparative negligence). Justice Leibson noted that"the doctrine of stare
decisis does not commit us to the sanctification of ancient fallacy ....

The

common law is not a stagnant pool, but a moving stream." Id. at 717 (citing City
of Louisville v. Chapman, 413 S.W.2d 74, 77 (1967)).
3 See infra notes 17-48 and accompanying
text.
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rights basis for that decision. 4 Part III will analyze critically the legislative
purpose behind punitive damages reform and the expansive scope of the
jural rights doctrine used to defeat that purpose. 5 Finally, Part IV will
examine the remaining portions of Kentucky's punitive damages statute
and suggest a shift to a restrained jural rights jurisprudence, an approach
more in line with that of other states. 6 This debate implicates the legitimacy of the jural rights doctrine and its proper role in Kentucky jurisprudence vis-a-vis the separation of powers doctrine. These issues go to the
heart of a citizen's right to his day in court and to the question of who
decides what that day in court really means.
I. THE ADOPTION OF THE PUNITIVE DAMAGES STATUTE
A.

The Punitive Damages "Crisis"

Punitive damages have been defined as "damages, other than compensatory or nominal damages, awarded against a person to punish him for his
outrageous conduct and to deter him and others like him from similar
conduct in the future."' 7 Punitive damages are, quite simply, awarded to
punish the defendant, and not for the purpose of compensating the
19
plaintiff.' Punitive damages have been criticized as "unfair windfall[s]'
to plaintiffs, sought by attorneys merely as a way to enlarge their fees. For
that reason, and many others, a movement known as "tort reform" burst
upon the national scene in the 1980s.20 Many observers claimed that the tort
compensation system was in "crisis," largely due to punitive damage
awards in medical malpractice and product liability lawsuits.2 ' Anecdotes

See infra notes 49-98 and accompanying text.
See
infra notes 99-175 and accompanying text.
'6 See infra notes 176-221 and accompanying text.
17RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(1) (1979). See generally Jane
"4
"

Massey Draper, Annotation, Excessiveness or Inadequacy ofPunitiveDamages
Awarded in PersonalInjury or Death Cases, 12 A.L.R. 5th 195 (1993).
" See RSTATEMENT(SECOND)OFTORTS § 908(1) cmt. b (1979); see alsoLRC
Report, supra note 3, at 22.
'" LRC Report, supra note 3, at 22.
20

For a survey of tort reform laws enacted since 1986, see generally Tort

Reform Record,AM. TORT REFORMASS'N, June 30, 1996.
21
See STEPHEN DANIELS & JOANNE MARTIN, CVIL JURIES AND THE POLmCS

OF REFORM 92 (1995) (arguing that "[i]t has become more a lottery than a rational
system"; quoting Dr. Otis Bowen, Secretary of Health and Human Services in the
Reagan administration).
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of extremely high jury verdicts-such as in the infamous "McDonald's
coffee case"--fueled the fire for those clamoring for reform."2 Media
reports lamenting such "freakish punitive damage bonanzas" helped to
bring the issue into public debate.
There is no consensus as to the existence of a "tort crisis"
and-assuming one does exist-no consensus respecting its resolution.24
In Kentucky, the General Assembly responded to "skyrocketing [insurance]
premiums"' 5 in 1986 by establishing the Kentucky Insurance and Liability
Task Force. A 1996 study, however, found that punitive damage awards
"are not as frequent or as big as tort reformers claim."2' 6 In fact, the Task
Force "found no evidence nor heard testimony that caused them to

' See Liebeckv. McDonald's Restaurants P.T.S., Inc., No. CV-93-02419,1995
WL 360309 (N.M. Dist. Ct. Aug. 18, 1994) (awarding the plaintiff $2.7 million in
punitive damages). For anecdotal evidence of the "litigation explosion"'
precipitating the tort reform movement, see DANIELS & MARTIN, supranote 21, at
5.
2 Theodore B. Olson, Was JusticeServed?, WALL ST. J., Oct 4, 1995, at A14.
24 Compare Bill Garmer, TortReform, Justicefor the Rich, Powerful andthe
Influential,KY. BENCH&BAR, Spring 1995, at3l, with Senator Mitch McConnell,
The CaseforLegalReform, KY. BENCH &BAR, Spring 1995, at 33. This debate on
the need (or lack thereof) for legislative action to accomplish tort reform in
Kentucky is emblematic of the national tort reform debate. For a criticism of tort
reform as largely unnecessary because neither the frequency nor the amount of
punitive damages are increasing, see PeterJ. Sajevic, Note, FailingThe Smell Test:
Punitive Damage Awards Raise the United States Supreme Court's Suspicious
JudicialEyebrow in BMW ofNorth America, Inc. v. Gore, 116S. Ct. 1589 (1996),
20 HAMLINE L. REV. 507, 550 (1996) (arguing that "[t]he empirical evidence
examining punitive damage awards does not conclusively indicate that punitive
damages are increasing in number or amount"). See also Stephen Daniels &Joanne
Martin, Myth andRealitiesin PunitiveDamages,75 MINN. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1990).
But cf.DANIELS & MARTIN, supra note 21, at 6 n.24 (noting that there were 401
punitive jury verdicts totaling over $1 million each in 1984) (citing Ted Gest &
Clemens P. Work, Sky-high DamageAwards, U.S. NEWS &WORLD REP., Jan. 27,
1986, at 35).
' LRC Report, supranote 3, at 267 (citing H.R.J. Res. 139). The Task force
was composed of attorneys, state and local officials, and representatives of diverse
groups such as insurance companies, the Kentucky Medical Association, and the
United Mine Workers. Id. at i.-ii. For a discussion of Kentucky tort reforms beyond
punitive damages, see Robert R. Sparks, A Survey ofKentucy TortReform, 17 N.
KY.26L. REV. 473 (1989).
Andrew Blum, Study Finds PunitivesAre Small, Rare, NAT'L L.J., July 1,
1996, at A6.
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conclude that there is a litigation explosion in Kentucky."2' Also, the
commission recognized that tort reform, at least in the immediate future,
would not reduce insurance premiums.28 However, it concluded that
reforms were necessary to "bring about a greater degree of efficiency,
' The
predictability and cost-effectiveness [in the civil justice system]."29
Task Force stated that "[t]here is concern with the tendency of our Courts
[sic] to broaden the opportunities for recovery of damages for a greater
array of injuries, economic and non-economic." 30 This concern with
efficiency, predictability, and limiting the expansion of the common law
will prove to be pivotal evidence of legislative intent in the forthcoming
31
jural rights debate.
The legitimacy of the need for legislative action in tort reform is a
political question beyond the scope of this Note. The question is,perhaps,
beyond the scope of the judiciary.32 The General Assembly, as the chosen
representative of the people of Kentucky, saw a crisis and chose to resolve
it. The only question for the courts, then, should be the constitutionality of
the legislature's actions.3 3 In fact, the General Assembly itself was acting,
in part, due to its own constitutional concerns. 34 The standard of recovery

27 LRC Report,
28 See id.

supra note 3, at 15.

29rd.

30Id.
31 See

infra notes 75-44 and accompanying text.
law is often described as having evolved over time and as mirroring the
interests of the class possessing political power in a given era. See Roger I.
Abrams, Tort Law andFamily Values, 48 RuTGERS L. REv. 619, 620-22 (1996)
(tracing how as negligence law developed to protect new industries in the
nineteenth century, products liability law simultaneously developed as a way for
plaintiffs to protect themselves from dangerous mass-produced products; but these
laws later evolved to reflect the values of "traditional defendants," such as
politically powerful product manufacturers and physicians). But cf. Stephen F.
Williams, Public Choice Theory andthe Judiciary:A Review ofJerryL. Mashaw's
Greed, Chaos, and Governance, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1599, 1618 (1998)
(pointing out the considerable influence of the plaintiff's bar lobby and noting that
consequently several courts have struck down legislative tort reform on "creative
constitutional grounds"). The author cites Williams v. Wilson as support for his
argument. See id. at n.59.
3 See infra notes 129-136 and accompanying text (discussing separation of
powers principles).
34Juries have traditionally been given much discretion in Kentucky.
However,
unclear jury charges in the punitive damages area create a greater potential for
32Tort

1999-2000]

A CALL FOR SEPARATION OF PowERs

forpunitive damages raises constitutional issues that go farbeyond the cost
of insurance rates. Kentucky has traditionally given great deference to jury
verdicts, even in the area of punitive damages. 5 However, to permit an
arbitrary award to stand would be to disregard section two of Kentucky's
Constitution.36 Moreover, due to the fact that punitive damages are above
and beyond mere compensation, courts must carefully scrutinize the
amount of the award to avoid a deprivation of property in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment.37 In addition, the Supreme Court has held that

arbitrary awards. See also KY. CONST. § 7 (stating that "[the ancient mode of trial
by jury shall be held sacred"). But see id. § 2 (declaring that "[a]bsolute and
arbitrary power over the lives, liberty, and propertyof freemen exists nowhere in
a republic, not even in the largest majority") (emphasis added).
35 See, e.g., USAA Cas. Ins. Co. v. Kramer, 987 S.W.2d
779, 781 (Ky. 1999)
(requiring a jury verdict to be "palpably and flagrantly" against the weight of the
evidence before an appeals court may overturn); Bierman v. Klapheke II, 967
S.W.2d 16, 19 (Ky. 1998) (holding that the reviewing court should not substitute
its judgment for that of the fact-finder unless the initial decision is clearly the result
of "passion or prejudice"). As a general rule, however, after BMW of North
America v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996), courts have more frequently reduced
punitive damage awards. See Daniel M. Weddle, A Practitioner's Guide to
Litigating Punitive Damages After BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 47
DRAKE L. REv. 661, 681 n.127 (1999). For a criticism of the recent trend and the
Goredecision itself, see Sajevic, supranote 24, at 509. Sajevic criticizes Gore for
providing a constitutional smokescreen under which courts can second-guess jury
decisions:
The Court's substantive due process analysis placed the Court in the role of
'Superjury' that reviews each punitive damage award independently. As
applied in Gore, this analysis constituted little more than a 'smell test'
whereby the Court invalidated the award because it disagreed with the jury
without providing guidance to future courts.
Id. 36
See KY. CoNST. § 2.
37 See
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV ("[N]or shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."). The Supreme Court has
held that a punitive damage award can be so "grossly excessive" as to violate the
Fourteenth Amendment. Gore, 517 U.S. at 574-75. The Gore Court listed three
factors which determine whether a punitive damages judgment is so excessive as
to constitute a Fourteenth Amendment "taking" of property: (1) the
"reprehensibility" of the defendant's conduct; (2) the ratio of punitive to
compensatory damages; and (3)the existence of any state sanctions for comparable
misconduct See id. at 575-85. But cf Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vermont, Inc. v.
Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 260 (1989) (holding that the Eighth
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punitive damages pose other due process concerns." Jury instructions
typically leave the jury with wide discretion in choosing amounts, and the
presentation of evidence of a defendant's net worth creates the potential
that juries will use their verdicts to express bias against big businesses,
particularly those lacking strong local connections.39 States have touted
punitive damage reform as an affirmative legislative step toward avoiding
federal constitutional challenges to punitive damages regimes.4" Therefore,
the General Assembly had a legitimate goal in enacting the punitive
damages statute: giving juries brighter guidelines, so as not to offend the
defendant's Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of law.4

Amendment "does not apply to awards of punitive damages in cases between
private parties"). For a litigation-based analysis of the three factors cited by Gore,
see Weddle,
supra note 35, at 671-81.
38
See Gore, 517 U.S. at 559.
39Justice O'Connor has opined:
Punitive damages are a powerful weapon. Imposed wisely and with
restraint, they have the potential to advance legitimate state interests.
Imposed indiscriminately, however, they have a devastating potential for
harm. Regrettably, common-lawprocedures for awarding punitive damages
fall into the latter category. States routinely authorize civil juries to impose
punitive damages without providing them any meaningful instructions on
how to do so. Rarely is a jury told anything more specific than "do what
you think best"....
... Juries are permitted to target unpopular defendants, penalize unorthodox or controversial views, and redistribute wealth. Multimillion dollar
losses are inflicted on a whim.
Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 42-43 (1991) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting)
(citations omitted).
40See
also Sajevic, supranote 24, at 550 (supporting giving deference to states
when the states have taken action to address Fourteenth Amendment concerns with
punitive damage awards). The author asserts that "[t]he Court should not have
intruded into an area traditionally of state's domain without more conclusive
evidence and without acknowledging that the states have already taken steps to
limit juror discretion in awarding punitive damages." Id. The American Tort
Reform Association has reported that 27 states passed tort reform legislation
concerning punitive damages from 1986 to 1989. See DANIELS & MARTIN, supra
note 21, at 200 n.7.
4 See Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415 (1994). The Court reversed and
remanded the Oregon judgment on the grounds that federal due process mandates
that state courts closely scrutinize punitive damage awards. See id. The Court
refused to hear the case a second time. See Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 517 U.S.
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Ultimately, the only question facing the Kentucky Supreme Court was
whether the legislative change to the punitive damages standard violated
the Kentucky Constitution.
B. Kentucky's Punitive Damages Statute-Kentucky Revised Statutes
Section 411.184
Findings by the Kentucky Liability and Insurance Task Force
ultimately resulted in the passage of House Bill 551, which became
effective on July 15, 1988.42 Part of this bill created a new section 411 of
the Kentucky Revised Statutes.43 The main differences between this section
and prior Kentucky punitive damages law lie in the definition ofmalice and
the standard of proof that a plaintiff must bear in order to be awarded
punitive damages. The statute codifies the limited situations where punitive
damages may be awarded,' whereas before this legislation punitive
damages were a common law matter. Changes include the requirement that
a plaintiff prove "by clear and convincing evidence, that the defendant
from whom such damages are sought acted toward the plaintiff with
oppression, fraud, or malice."'45 Malice was the critical factor found
unconstitutional in Williams. Malice is defined under the statute as follows:
"Malice" means either conduct which is specifically intended by the
defendant to cause tangible or intangible injury to the plaintiff or conduct
that is carried out by the defendant both with a flagrant indifference to the
rights of the plaintiff and with a subjective awarenessthat such conduct
will result in human death or bodily harm.46

1219 (1996) (mem.) (denying certiorari to Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 888 P.2d
8 (Or. 1995)). The Court's refusal to review this case after judgment on remand
arguably limits the impact of Gore on personal injury actions. See Bruce J. McKee,
The Implications of BMW v. Gore for Future Punitive Damages Litigation:
Observationsfrom a Participant,48 ALA. L. REV. 175, 195 (1996).
42 See LRC Report, supranote 3, at 80.
" This section was "applicable to all cases in which punitive damages are
sought and supersedes any and all existing statutory or judicial law insofar as such
law is inconsistentwith the provisions ofthis statute." K.R.S. §411.184(5) (BanksBaldwin 1999).
"4See
id. § 411.184.
451Id.
§411.184(2); see also supranote 5 (describing the previous common law
standard).
46 K.R.S. § 411.184(1)(c) (emphasis added).
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Specifically, the Williams Court found the "subjective awareness"
requirement to be in conflict with thejural rights doctrine (the common law
right of plaintiffs to recover damages) and thus unconstitutional.47
However, the issue of whether the "clear and convincing" standard is
constitutional, left open by the Williams court, can only be evaluated by
exploring the future scope of the jural rights doctrine.48
II. THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE:
THE JURAL RIGHTS DOCTRINE
A. Williams v. Wilson
On May 18, 1990, Patricia Wilson, a teacher, was driving to her school
in Lexington, Kentucky.49 Wilson's car was struck at an intersection by a
vehicle driven by Teri Williams. 0 Williams was arrested at the scene for
driving under the influence and later pled guilty.5' Wilson sued Williams
in Fayette Circuit Court seeking compensatory and punitive damages. 2

47See

Williams v. Wilson, 972 S.W.2d 260, 269 (Ky. 1998). For an example
of how the Kentucky Supreme Court applied the "subjective awareness"
requirement of the punitive damages statute, see Bowling Green Municipal Utility
v. Atmos Energy Corp., 989 S.W.2d 577 (Ky. 1999). Atmos involved a natural gas
supplier sued for damages arising from an explosion due to a gas leak in sub-zero
weather. See id. at 581. The punitive damages statute was still in effect at the time
of the accident and trial, thus the court required the plaintiffs to prove "subjective
awareness." Id. at 580. The court found insufficient evidence to support an award
of punitive damages, noting that the accident occurred "suddenly and without
warning" due to the extreme cold. Id. at 581. The dissent, while applying the same
statute, found the evidence to support a punitive damages charge because the pipe
was dented so much that it "should have been replaced rather than repaired." Id. at
582 (Lambert, C.J., dissenting). This case represents an instance where the punitive
damages statute worked to avoid punitive liability when proof of conscious
awareness was tenuous. The dissent demonstrates that it is still reasonably possible
to infer subjective intent without an admission or other direct testimony of
conscious awareness. See infra notes 101-110 and accompanying text (discussing
the inference of conscious awareness).
48See infra notes 190-221 and accompanying text (proposing a more restrained
approach
to the jural rights doctrine).
49 See
Williams, 972 S.W.2d at 261.
50

See id.
s'
See id.
52
See id.
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Williams was represented by counsel, but did not personally appear, nor
was she available for discovery. 3
At the close of the evidence, Williams objected to instructing the jury
on punitive damages, claiming that there was no evidence of her subjective
awareness that death or bodily harm would result from her actions.54 The
trial court agreed with Williams, and Wilson then asserted that the 1988
punitive damages statute was unconstitutional in that the "subjective
awareness" requirement changed the common law in violation of the jural
rights doctrine. In response to this argument, the trial court found it
appropriate to give a common law "wanton or reckless" instruction. The
court of appeals affirmed the trial court's verdict for Williams; Wilson then
appealed to the Kentucky Supreme Court. 7
The Kentucky Supreme Court addressed two issues in its review: (1)
whether the statute in question infringed upon the jural rights doctrine, and
(2) if so, whether the jural rights doctrine is sound." The court answered
both questions in the affirmative. 9 In order to understand the court's
holding that the right to recover for gross negligence invalidated the
subjective awareness portion of the punitive damages statute, it is first
necessary to understand the jural rights doctrine.
B. The Origin of the JuralRights Doctrine
Thejural rights doctrine is not specifically mentioned in the Kentucky
Constitution. Former Chief Justice Stephens has recognized that "there is
very little, if any, basis for this now routinely accepted doctrine in the

53 See id. Justice Cooper

noted that this failure to appear was the pivotal factor
leading the trial judge to declare it impossible to prove "subjective awareness,"
compelling the conclusion that the statute is invalid. See infra note 111 and
accompanying text. Justice Cooper took a different view, however, noting that the
Kentucky Supreme Court had previously rejected the argument that subjective
awareness could only be proven by direct testimony of the defendant He also cited
the principle that "a plaintiffis entitled to prove a defendant's state ofmind through
circumstantial evidence." Williams, 972 S.W.2d at 270 (Cooper, J., dissenting)
(quoting Ball v. E.W. Scripps Co., 801 S.W.2d 684, 689 (1990)).
5 See Williams, 972 S.W.2d at 261.
" See id.
56 See id.
57 See id. at 262.
58 See id. at 260-61.
51 See id. at 269.
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Kentucky Constitution or in the Constitutional Debates."' Rather, the
Kentucky Supreme Court created it in the 1932 case ofLudwigv. Johnson6 1
by reading together three sections of the Kentucky Constitution. The
Ludwig court combined sections 14,54, and 241 and concluded that "[when
read together] the conclusion is inescapable that the intention of the
framers of the Constitution was to inhibit the Legislature from abolishing
rights of action for damages for death or injuries caused by negligence."62
These three sections of the Kentucky Constitution read as follows:
Section 14:
All courts shall be open, and every person for an injury done him in
his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due course
of law, and right and justice administered without sale, denial or delay.63
Section 54:
The General Assembly shall have no power to limit the amount to be
recovered for injuries resulting in death, or for injuries to person or
property.'
Section 241:
Whenever the death of a person shall result from an injury inflicted
by negligence or wrongful act, then, in every such case, damages may be
recovered for such death, from the corporations and persons so causing
the same. Until otherwise provided by law, the action to recover such
damages shall in all cases be prosecuted by the personal representative of
the deceased person. The General Assembly may provide how the
recovery shall go and to whom belong; and until such provision is made,
65
the same shall form part of the personal estate of the deceased person.
Provisions similar to the "open courts" and "limiting" language in
sections 14 and 54, respectively, have been interpreted outside Kentucky
as allowing courts to use heightened scrutiny for legislative changes to tort
law; there is arguably historical justification for such a construction.66
6 1Id.(Stephens,

C.J., concurring).
Ludwig v. Johnson, 49 S.W.2d 347 (Ky. 1932).
62
Id.at 350.
61

63

Ky.CONST. § 14.
Id.§ 54.
65
Id.§ 241.
66
The historical origins of such "open courts" provisions have been traced to
64

the time of the Magna Carta, which was meant in part to ensure that courts were
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However, the fact that the constitution does not refer to "jural rights," nor
to reading the above sections in tandem, has led to much scholarly criticism
of the court's decision in Ludwig.67 For example, Thomas Lewis, former
Dean and Professor of Law at the University of Kentucky College of Law,
has interpreted section 14 as merely guaranteeing process and "due course
of law," not as a delegation to courts to declare substantive law.68
Despite criticisms, the Kentucky Supreme Court has repeatedly held
sinceLudwigthat the purpose of section 14 is "to preserve thosejural rights
which had become well established prior to the adoption of the Constitution. '69 For example, in Kentucky Utilities Co. v. Jackson County Rural
accessible without having to pay the king for a special writ to "open" the court. See
Janice Sue Wang, Comment, State ConstitutionalRemedy ProvisionsandArticle
1, Section 10 of the Washington State Constitution: The Possibility of Greater
JudicialProtectionofEstablishedTort CausesofAction andRemedies,64 WASH.
L. REv. 203, 205 (1989) (citing Davidson v. Rogers, 574 P.2d 624, 625 (1978)
(Linde, J., concurring) (noting that the Magna Carta is the origin of state remedy
provisions)). Connections between the Magna Carta and state remedy provisions
have been attributed to Sir Edward Coke, but the historical accuracy of this nexus
theory has been greatly criticized. See id.at 206.
6
See, e.g., Lewis, supranote 8, at 966 (stating the court's interpretation of the
jural68rights provision when the 1891 constitutional convention opened).
.[d.

Happy v. Erwin, 330 S.W.2d 412, 413-14 (Ky. 1959); see also Perkins v.
Northeastern Log Homes, 808 S.W.2d 809, 816 (Ky. 1991); McCollum v. Sisters
of Charity, 799 S.W.2d 15, 19 (Ky. 1990); Carney v. Moody, 646 S.W.2d 40, 41
(Ky. 1982); Saylor v. Hall, 497 S.W.2d 218, 222 (Ky. 1973); Kentucky Util. Co.
v. Jackson County Rural Elec. Coop. Corp., 438 S.W.2d 788, 790 (Ky. 1969).
Perkins refined the Kentucky Supreme Court's holding in Carney, decided nine
years earlier, which took a considerably more restrained approach to applying the
jural rights doctrine. See Carney, 646 S.W.2d at 41 ("Our construction of [sections
14 and 54] is and should be that which leaves to the policy-making arm of
government the broadest discretion consistent with their language."). High courts
in states with "open courts" provisions quite similar to the provisions at issue in
Kentucky's constitution have held that the legislature can freely alter punitive
damages, because plaintiffs have no vested right to them. See, e.g., Ross v. Gore,
48 So. 2d 412, 414 (Fla. 1950) (en banc) (holding that punitive damages are
allowed not as compensation to a plaintiff). The Ross court declared that "It]he
right to have punitive damages assessed is not property; and it is the general rule
that, until a judgment is rendered, there is no vested right in a claim for punitive
damages." Id. (citing Kelly v. Hall, 12 S.E.2d 881 (Ga. 1941)). See also Osborn v.
Leach, 47 S.E. 811,813 (N.C. 1904) (stating that "[punitive damages] are awarded
on grounds of public policy, and not because the plaintiff has a right to the money,
but it goes to him merely because it is assessed in his suit') (citations omitted).
69
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Electric CooperativeCorp.," the plaintiff sought indemnity in a wrongful
death action. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant,
however, citing an exclusive remedy provision in the Workers' Compensation Act.71 The court of appeals reversed, holding that the common law
right of indemnity existed in the state of Kentucky.72 Moreover, since the
right to indemnity existed prior to the adoption of the Kentucky Constitution, under the ruling of Ludwig it could not be eliminated by the General
Assembly.73 This same reasoning was used by the Williams court in striking
down part of the punitive damages statute.
Having identified the basic premise of the jural rights doctrine as it is
utilized by Kentucky courts, the distinction between gross negligence and
subjective awareness-posited throughout Williams-may be better
assessed. In Ludwig, the fons et origo of Kentucky's jural rights doctrine,
the court held that the guest statute at issue abolished the well-established
right of a passenger to sue a driver for negligence.74 Therefore, the clear
issue to be decided in Williams, from the court's jural rights perspective,
was whether there was a "well-established right" to obtain punitive
damages under the objective gross negligence standard in 1891, and
whether the punitive damages statute abolished that right.
C. "Gross Negligence" v. "Subjective Awareness: " the Standardfor
PunitiveDamages Recovery in 1891
The fact that a right must be "well-established" at common law in order
to receive jural rights protection is supported not only by Ludwig, but also
by the venerable principle in Kentucky law that statutes are presumed valid
unless they "clearly offend" the constitution.' Therefore, the historical
pursuit in Williams for the status of the law in 1891 is necessary ifthejural
rights doctrine is to be applied. The obvious difficulty in the historical
analysis is that cases from the 1890s appear to allow recovery for both
"subjective" and "objective" awareness.76 An example of an early case
70Kentucky

Util. Co. v. Jackson County Rural Elec. Coop. Corp., 438 S.W.2d
788 (Ky. 1968).
"' See id. at 789 (citing K.R.S. § 342.015(1) (repealed 1972)).
72 See id. at 790.
73
See id.
See Ludwig v. Johnson, 49 S.W.2d 347, 351 (Ky. 1932).
7 5See Johnson v. Commonwealth ex rel. Meredith,
165 S.W.2d 820, 823 (Ky.
1942); Happy v. Erwin, 330 S.W.2d 412, 413-14 (Ky. 1959).
76 For a summary of early Kentucky cases (and those from other jurisdictions)
defining the standard of recovery for punitive damages, see generally Annotation,
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allowing the plaintiff to recover without proof of subjective awareness of
risk is Fleet v. Hollenkemp.7 That case awarded punitive damages where
a pharmacist accidentally mixed a poisonous substance into a drug
"whether ignorantly or by design, whether with or without the knowledge
of the defendants.""8 The court allowed the jury to award punitive damages
for "negligence, wantonness, or with or without malice."79
Another example of recovery for mere gross negligence, without any
proof of intent, is Maysville & Lexington Railroadv. Herrick."°In Herrick,
the plaintiff received punitive damages for the defendant railroad's negligence without showing "intentional misconduct.""1 Yet another railroad
case, Louisville & Nashville Railroadv. McCoy, 2 is even more explicit
about not requiring proof of intent to recover punitive damages. The
McCoy trial court allowed recovery for "negligence which indicates
intentional wrong to others, or such a reckless disregard of their security or
rights as to imply bad faith."8 3 Importantly, the Kentucky Supreme Court
overruled the trial court, stating that gross negligence required no proof of
a defendant's intention to cause harm, to act in bad faith, to behave
fraudulently or maliciously, or to demonstrate such a reckless disregard for
other's rights as to imply bad faith."
It is clear that Kentucky cases prior to 1891 allowed recovery for gross
negligence, without a showing of intent, by labeling the actions of the defendant with a variety of different terms. 5 However, Kentucky courts durTest or Criterion of Gross Negligence or Other Misconduct That Will Support
Recovery of Exemplary Damages for Bodily Injury or Death Unintentionally
Inflicted, 98 A.L.R. 267, 273 (1935), stating that "[t]he Kentucky cases as to the
character of conduct necessary to support exemplary damages, at least in the case
of bodily injury, do not appear to be entirely in accord." Other states have codified
the standard for recovery of punitive damages because "'[g]ross' negligence
simply covers too broad and too vague an area of behavior." Owens-Illinois, Inc.
v. Zenobia, 601 A.2d 633, 651 (Md. 1992) (quoting Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 A.2d
1353, 1361 (Me. 1985)).
"
Fleet v. Hollenkemp, 52 Ky. (13 B. Mon.) 219 (1852).
78
1d. at 227.
7
9 Id. at 226.
8oMaysville & Lexington R.R. v. Herrick,
76 Ky. (13 Bush) 122 (1877).
Id. at 127.
s Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. McCoy, 81 Ky. 403 (1883).
831 d. at 409.
84See id.at 411.
" See, e.g., Reichmanv. Storkle, 3 Ky. Op. 295,296 (1869) (allowing recovery
for negligence "so gross as to raise the presumption of malice"); see also Hawkins
& Co. v. Riley, 56 Ky. (17 B. Mon.) 101, 106 (1856) (allowing recovery for
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ing the same time period also limited recovery of punitive damages to a
showing of some degree of subjective intent.8 6 In fact, the court of appeals
in 1939 explained the nearly contradictory definitions of gross negligence
used in earlier Kentucky decisions with the acknowledgement that "'[n]o
adequate definition has yet been formulated by the courts of the term'gross
negligence,' beyond such broad generalities as that 'gross negligence is the
want of slight diligence,' and similar unworkable rules."' 87
Some nineteenth century Kentucky courts did limit punitive damages
by requiring at least some inference of intent, similar to that in the punitive
damages statute. In Louisville & NashvilleRailroadv.Robinson,8 the court
defined conduct of a defendant necessary to justify a punitive damages
award as "either an intentional wrong, or such a reckless disregard of
security and right, as to imply bad faith, and therefore, squints at fraud, and
is tantamount to the magna culpa of the civil law which, in some respects,
is quasi criminal."8 9
An illustration of the degree of the "quasi-criminal" intent required for
punitive damages is provided by the facts of Chiles v. Drake.90 In Chiles,
the defendant walked into a room full of people and drew a loaded pistol
which ultimately discharged in his hand, killing the plaintiff's husband.91
The court awarded the plaintiff punitive damages despite the fact that it
found no intent to kill or animosity on the part of the defendant. The court
stated that "drawing and presenting a loaded pistol, with an intention to use
it in a room where many persons were together, manifests such an utter
disregard of the consequences... as leaves the party without any excuse
for his conduct."92
Later cases have been even more forceful in requiring conscious
awareness on the part of the defendant before awarding punitive damages.
For example, in National Casket Co. v. Powar,93 punitive damages were
limited to conduct showing "wanton disregard of the lives or safety of
wantonness, recklessness, or gross negligence).
6See Louisville
& Nashville R.R v. George, 129 S.W.2d 986,989 (Ky. 1939)
(requiring a showing of "constructive or legal willfulness" to recover punitive
damages).
871d. (quoting
10 AM. JUR. Carriers§ 1147).
88 Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Robinson, 67 Ky. (4 Bush) 507 (1868),
overruled
in partby Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. McCoy, 81 Ky. 403 (1883).
89Id. at 509.
9 Chiles v. Drake, 59 Ky. (2 Met.) 146 (1859).
91See id. at 154-55.
92Id. at 155.
13 National Casket Co. v. Powar, 125 S.W. 279
(Ky. 1910).
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others or [which] is willful or malicious."'94 That case involved plaintiffs
who were thrown from their horse-drawn buggy when the defendant's car
sped past them, frightening their horse.95 The court of appeals reversed a
more plaintiff-oriented lower court instruction and held that the defendant
either had to be conscious of the horse's fright, or the conditions had to be
such that he was "necessarily put.., on notice that such conditions would
most likely result from a continuation of his course."96
In modem cases, courts have returned to requiring "conscious
awareness" before awarding punitive damages, a standard even more
similar to that in the punitive damages statute. Courts have held that "[t]he
key element in deciding whether punitives are appropriate is malice or
conscious wrongdoing." In fact, in determining whether punitive damages
are appropriate, the element of "conscious wrongdoing" has been held to
be more important than whether the act was intentional." It is safe to say
that modem courts have not felt limited by the "objective definition" of
gross negligence relied upon by the Williams court. This fact is evidenced
by the conflicting terminology, and even standards, used by Kentucky
courts in awarding punitive damages.

III. EXPLAINING WILL!AMS:
AN UNNECESSARY EXPANSION OF JURAL RIGHTS
A.

The GeneralAssembly Sought to Clarify Ambiguous Common Law
Standards

The General Assembly's express intent in enacting the punitive
damages statute was to "bring about a greater degree of efficiency,
predictability and cost effectiveness'" in the awarding of punitive
damages. There is no doubt that the common law was lacking in predictability, as shown by the conflicting terminology and standards. Moreover,
since punishment and deterrence are the motives behind punitive damages
to begin with, requiring the defendant to have some degree of awareness
94Id. at 282.
95 See id. at 280.
96 Id.
at 282.
97 Simpson

County Steeplechase Ass'n v. Roberts, 898 S.W.2d 523,525 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1995) (citing Fowler v. Mantooth, 683 S.W.2d 250, 252 (Ky. 1984)).
98
See Fowler,683 S.W.2d at 252 ('The mere fact that the act is intentional and
a tort does not justify punitive damages absent this additional element of implied
malice, meaning conscious wrongdoing.") (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
99 LRC Report, supra note 3, at 15.

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 88

appeals to common sense notions of deterrence.'" Those without intent or
awareness of the potential danger of their actions are obviously less
deserving of punishment and less likely to be deterred in future cases. It is
clear that permitting a defendant to avoid a punitive damage award by
failing to testify (and thus preventing the plaintiff from proving subjective
awareness) would be unjust and unfair to plaintiffs, as was the concern in
Williams. The element of conscious awareness, however, can still be
inferred by a jury without a defendant's testimony.
Kentucky juries and courts have long been adequately able to infer
conscious awareness, even after the punitive damages statute was
enacted.' Ironically, less than two weeks before the Kentucky Supreme
Court reached its decision in Williams, the court of appeals applied the
punitive damages statute without difficulty in Roman CatholicDiocese of
Covington v. Secter. 02
In Secter, the trial court awarded punitive damages to a plaintiff who
was sexually abused by a teacher while attending a school operated by the
Diocese.0 3 The Diocese sought to avoid punitive damages by pointing to
the plain language of the statute, which requires a showing of oppression,
fraud, or malice."° The Diocese asserted that there was no proof of malice
toward Secter because it was not aware that the teacher (over whom the
Diocese had supervisory authority) had abused or would abuse Secter
specifically.'0 Nevertheless, the jury and the court of appeals found the
requisite malice, without having to conclude that there was "intent" (i.e.,
" See Stewart v. Southeastern Group Inc., No. 97-CA-002908-MR, 1999 WL
557630, at *2 (Ky. Ct. App. July 23, 1999) ("The term punitive damages means
'damages, other than compensatory and nominal damages, awarded against a
person to punish and to discourage him and others from similar conduct in the
fiture' ")(quoting K.R.S. §411.184(f) (Banks-Baldwin 1999)) (emphasis added).
See also Sajevic, supra note 24, at 520 ("Under the punishment rationale of just
desserts, the wrongdoer is made to suffer for the harm caused, thereby rectifying
the wrong and restoring the victim's rights.") (citing DAN B. BOBBs, LAW OF
REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY-RESTrUTION 313, 318 (2d ed. 1993)).
' 1o See, e.g., Williams v. Wilson, 972 S.W.2d 260,270 (Ky. 1998) (Cooper, J.,
dissenting) (noting that a defendant's intent can be inferred by the jury in a criminal
case by the act itself or its accompanying circumstances, even though the burden
of proof is more stringent (beyond a reasonable doubt) than in the punitive
damages context).
102 Roman Catholic Diocese of Covington v. Secter, 966 S.W.2d 286,290 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1998).
03
' See id. at 287.
'04
See id. at 291.
105 See id.
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desire) to abuse the plaintiff on the part of the Diocese. 6 This case
illustrates that intent can be inferred from circumstances or omissions
without proving that the defendant "desired" the outcome.
The Secter court then noted another recent Kentucky case allowing a
punitive damages instruction for drunk driving, even though the defendant's conduct was not specifically directed toward the plaintiff. 7 Two
years before the Williams decision, Shortridgev. Rice (a court of appeals
case) held that the voluntary intoxication of a driver was sufficient to
support an award of punitive damages under the statute.' The court
commented that "KkS 411.184 onlyrequires an 'awareness' of the possible
consequences. The statute does not require a deliberate or specific intent
that the 'conduct' . . . result in human death or bodily harm. The
'awareness' requirement can be satisfied by a showing of mere 'consciousness' or cognizance of potential danger."'" The court of appeals
concluded that "[e]vidence that an individual was driving under the
influence undoubtedly shows 'a flagrant indifference to the rights of [other
drivers and pedestrians].' "110
As the cases above demonstrate, conscious awareness can be inferred
from the circumstances. Declaring the punitive damages statute unconstitutional is not an appropriate response to one case in which the trial
judge felt that a jury could not infer conscious awareness without testimony from the defendant. Apparently, the Williams trial court was so
stunned by the fact that Wilson did not testify that it thought the only
solution was to conclude that intent could not be inferred without an
admission from the defendant."' Wilson was convicted of driving while

'o See id.Punitive damages were awarded after finding that the Diocese failed
to discipline Bierman, who was also a priest, or inform students, parents, or
authorities of its knowledge that he had previously sexually abused students. See
id. at 287-88, 290. It seems that the Diocese's knowledge of Bierman's prior
criminal acts was sufficient to show subjective awareness that he was highly
capable of abusing this particular plaintiff.
07
' See id. at 291 (citing Shortridge v. Rice, 929 S.W.2d 194, 197-98 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1996)).
118 Shortridge,929 S.W.2d at 197 ('W'hile neither this Court nor the Supreme
Court has thus far interpreted the current version of KRS 411.184 to cover injuries
caused by a drunk driver, we believe that the statute does encompass such
situations.") (citation omitted).
"OId. at 197-98 (citations omitted).
HIOld. at 197 (quoting K.RS. § 411.184 (Banks-Baldwin 1999)).
"'.See Williams v. Wilson, 972 S.W.2d 260, 270 (Ky. 1998) (Cooper, J.,
dissenting). When the case reached the Kentucky Supreme Court, Justice
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intoxicated.1" 2 If the Kentucky Supreme Court was uncomfortable with
creating a rule of law holding voluntary intoxication always sufficient for
punitive damages, then perhaps expert testimony could have convinced the
jury of Williams' conscious awareness 13 However, the inability of a
litigant to produce sufficient evidence should have no bearing on the
constitutionality of the punitive damages statute, or any other statute.
The General Assembly's intent to provide more certainty regarding the
levels of conduct necessary to qualify for punitive damages does not
require abolishing the cause of action altogether."1 4 At the outset, the

Cooper opined that the entire constitutional challenge presented in Williams should
have been avoided by a proper jury instruction on the punitive damages statute,
as the plaintiff initially requested. See id.at 272 (Cooper, J., dissenting). Permitting the jury to decide whether drunk driving demonstrates conscious awareness
of wrongdoing could also allow citizens of the Commonwealth to take a strong
stand against this behavior. Jury verdicts awarding punitive damages based upon
driving under the influence would result in a warning to the public against future
conduct such as this, consistent with the real deterrence goal behind punitive
damages.
12 See id. at 261; supra text accompanying note 51.
The court evidently did not establish a categorical "rule of law" to the effect
that conscious awareness could never be shown without testimony from the
defendant in a drunk driving case. In fact, it would seem that public policy dictates
the opposite result: that voluntary drunk driving should always be regarded as
"conscious wrongdoing." Justice Cooper's dissent implies that such a rule of law
should have been established. He states that "[i]t is no longer arguable in this day
and age that proof of the act of driving while intoxicated creates an inference of
'subjective awareness' on the part of the actor of the potential consequences of the
act." Williams, 972 S.W.2d at 271 (Cooper, J., dissenting). Two years earlier, the
court of appeals had listed several states which have held voluntary intoxication
while driving sufficient to justify a punitive damage award. See Shortridge,929
S.W.2d at 197 (citing Owens v. Anderson, 631 So.2d 1313 (La. Ct. App. 1994);
Cabe v. Lunich, 640 N.E.2d 159 (Ohio 1994); Flockhart v. Wyant, 467 N.W.2d
473 (S.D. 1991); Perry v. Dewey, No. 02A01-9406-CV-00142, 1995 WL 422660
(Tenn. Ct. App. July 18, 1995); Huffman v. Love, 427 S.E.2d 357 (Va. 1993)).
However, there is firm ground for not creating a rule of law that a defendant's
voluntary intoxication and subsequent accident are always sufficient for punitive
damages. The Supreme Court has held that "trickery and deceit" are more
compatible with punitive damages than is negligence, and repeated conduct is more
significant than just one or two isolated instances. See BMW of North America,
Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 576-77 (1996).
114 See infra notes 141-163 for a case abolishing the cause of action. In this
situation, however, the court ab 9 lished the cause of action, not the legislation.
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Williams court examined whether the punitive damages statute "abolished"
a cause of action;' 1 5 however, the outcome of Williams was due to an
extension of thejural rights doctrine beyond the question of "abolishment"
11 6
to include scrutiny as to whether a statute "impairs" a jural right.
Clarifying levels of conduct evidently equals an "impairment" for jural
rights purposes. In the criminal context, the General Assembly has codified
and clarified the elusive definition of "wanton."" 7 This principle of
codification should be extended to the civil context, because (as the
Kentucky cases aptly demonstrate) punitive damages are often awarded for
"reckless" conduct, and the definition of "reckless" includes conduct that
is wide and varied.11 Since punitive damages are not compensatory, there
is a parallel between them and the legislature's action in the criminal
context." 9 The "clear and convincing evidence" standard in the punitive
damages statute addresses the "quasi-criminal nature" of these awards. 20
Moreover, the subjective awareness requirement set forth by the General
Assembly was a valid effort to provide more certainty, more "notice" to
defendants of the kind of conduct that could result in punitive damage
2
awards.1 1

"sSee

Williams, 972 S.W.2d at 260-61.
id. at 272 (Cooper, J., dissenting).
"' See Brown v. Commonwealth, 975 S.W.2d 922, 923-24 (Ky. 1998) (citing
K.R.S. § 507.020, Commentary (Banks-Baldwin 1998)).
18 See supra note 76; see also Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Fairnessand Efficiency in
the Law ofPunitiveDamages,56 S.CAL. L. REV. 1,22 (1982) (noting that reckless
conduct is hard to objectively measure, on a uniform basis, because it involves a
weighing of matters that may be "incommensurable," such as risk of harm and the
utility of dangerous conduct). Ellis recommends codifying the standards for
punitive damage awards to alleviate the problem of lack of notice to defendants.
See id. at22 n.113.
...
For a broad look at the similarities between criminal punishment and tort
"punishment" (punitive damages in particular), see generally Thomas Koenig &
MichaelRustad, "Crimtorts"as CorporateJustDeserts,31 U. MICH. J.L.REFORm
289 (1998).
"'The "quasi criminal nature ofpunitive damages" was emphasized by Justice
Cooper when he stated that the "clear and convincing evidence" burden of proof
was "middle ground" between the normal civil standard ("preponderance of the
evidence") and the criminal burden ("beyond a reasonable doubt"). Williams, 972
S.W.2d at 271 (Cooper, J., dissenting).
..
1 See Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 2 (1991) (holding that
punitive damage awards must have "objective criteria' so as to not offend the
Fourteenth Amendment).
116 See
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It is ironic that many of the cases defining the subjective versus
objective standard for punitive damages involve railroad liability." The
legislative history of section 54 of the Kentucky Constitution, the heart of
the jural rights doctrine, speaks of the delegates' concern with improper
railroad influence on the governing body:
The Legislature has, perhaps, in some cases, put a limit upon the
amount to be recovered for damages by railroad accidents to persons
resulting in death or in injury to person or property. This section forbids
the General Assembly from putting any limit upon the amount of damages
12 3
to be recovered, leaving it to the jury.
Limiting the amount of damages to be recovered is far different from
codifying standards governing obtaining damages. The General Assembly,
in the punitive damages statute, did not seek to limit amounts of damages.
The concern over having a particular constituent, such as railroad or
insurance companies, corrupt the legislative process is valid. The Kentucky
Constitution, however, already has special protection for these concerns
with the "special legislation" provision,'24 which provides more "bite" than
even federal equal protection." If the General Assembly corruptly favors
one group, intentionally or in effect, the supreme court can declare the
See, e.g., Perkins v. Northeastern Log Homes, 808 S.W.2d 809, 811-12 (Ky.
1991) (noting that the jural rights provisions, and others in the Kentucky
Constitution of 1891, were enacted because of concerns that the General Assembly
was giving special privileges to railroads and other corporate interests).
12 3 OFFICIALREPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION
2

ASSEMBLED AT FRANKFORT, ON THE SEVENTEENTH DAY OF FEBRUARY, 1890, TO
ADOPT, AMEND, OR CHANGETHE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF KENTUCKY 3793

(1890).
124 Special legislation, as defined by Kentucky HarlanCoal Co. v. Holmes, 872
S.W.2d 446 (Ky. 1994), is that "which arbitrarily orbeyond reasonable justification
discriminates against some persons or objects and favors others." See id. at 452
(quoting Board of Educ. of Jefferson County v. Board of Educ. of Louisville, 472
S.W.2d 496, 498 (1971)). See also White v. Manchester Enter., 910 F. Supp. 311,
315 (E.D. Ky. 1996) ("For a law to pass scrutiny under § 59 [the special legislative
provision] it must satisfy two requirements: (1) it must apply equally to all in a
class, and (2) there must be distinctive and natural reasons inducing and supporting
the classification.").
125 See Ky. CONST. §§ 59, 60; Tabler v. Wallace, 704 S.W.2d 179, 183 (Ky.
1985) (noting that § 59(5) "is much more detailed and specific than the equal
protection clause of the Federal Constitution").
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legislation invalid by pointing to the special legislation provision. 26 In fact,
Williams actually cited the above rationale, prevention of favoritism toward
one group by "immuniz[ing] private groups the Legislature determined to
be entitled to immunity,"' 27 as a reason for the jural rights doctrine.
Whatever intentions the framers may have had for the constitutional
provisions which comprise the modem jural rights doctrine, the special
legislation provision can protect just as well. However, when the special
legislation doctrine is not implicated, the court's current application of the
jural rights doctrine (which smacks of policy-making) raises separation of
powers concerns. The Williams court has been criticized for its subtle yet
dramatic expansion of the jural rights doctrine from testing whether
legislation "abolishes" a cause of action to testing whether the legislation
"impairs" the cause of action.' This expansion is but an initial example of
the doctrine which provides constitutional "justification" for the court to
propound policy.
B. A CriticalLook atJuralRights Jurisprudence
Unlike the jural rights doctrine, the doctrine of separation
of powers is
29
expressly enumerated in the Kentucky Constitution:
The powers of the government of the Commonwealth of Kentucky shall
be divided into three distinct departments, and each of them be confined
See Lewis, supra note 8, at 958 (citing Tabler, 704 S.W.2d at 183) (the
special legislation provision in the Kentucky Constitution, section 59, protects
against special legislation specifically in 29 listed subjects, including legislation
enacted "to regulate the limitation of civil or criminal actions").
127 Williams, 972 S.W.2d at 266 (citing Happy v. Erwin, 330 S.W.2d 412,414
(Ky. 1959)). The full statement was that "ifthe Legislature could immunize certain
classes of public officers, it could exempt all public officers and employees from
liability, and if logically extended, could immunize private groups the Legislature
determined to be entitled to immunity." Id. This hypothetical discriminatory
enactment feared by the Williams court is the very legislation protected by the
special legislation provision. See id.
128 See Williams, 972 S.W.2d at 272 (Cooper, J., dissenting) ("As Professor
Lewis foresaw, this Court has now assumed for itself the sole power to make any
meaningful changes in the area of tort law."). Professor Lewis has commented that
"[ilt is undoubtedly the case, however, that somejustices see the three sections [14,
54, 241] as interlocking strands that restrain the General Assembly in a web from
which there is no escape." Lewis, supra,note 8, at 954.
.2.
See Legislative Research Comm'n v. Brown, 664 S.W.2d 907,911-12 (Ky.
1984).
126
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to a separate body of magistracy, to wit: Those which are legislative, to
one; those which are executive, to another; and those which are judicial,
130
to another.
Section 28 of the Kentucky Constitution holds that "[n]o person or
collection of persons, being of one of those departments, shall exercise any
power properly belonging to either of the others, except in the instances
hereinafter expressly directed or permitted."'3 1 Section 29 of the Kentucky
Constitution places legislative power in the General Assembly, including
"all powers which are solely and exclusively legislative in nature.' 3 2 The
power to make public policy by amending, modifying, or repealing
33
provisions of the common law is an inherently legislative function.
Statutes are presumed constitutional; in fact, Ludwig, the case giving rise
to the jural rights doctrine, warned that "every doubt as to the constitutionality of a law must be resolved in favor of its validity."' 134 The Kentucky
Supreme Court held that "[the] court has only one duty to 'lay the article
of the constitution which is invoked beside the statute which is challenged
and to decide whether the latter squares with the former."", 35 It is beyond
the court's authority to overturn a legislative act because the "public policy
promulgated therein is contrary to what the court considers to be in the
public interest."' 136 The above interpretations of the Kentucky Constitution
seriously challenge the supreme court's decision to choose among the
different standards for the award of punitive damages and constitutionalize

130 Ky.CONST. § 27.
13 1.d.

§ 28.
664 S.W.2d at 913. See generallyKY. CoNsT. §29 ("The legislative
power shall be vested in a House of Representatives and a Senate, which, together,
shall be styled the 'General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Kentucky."').
'3 See, e.g., Pryor v. Thomas, 361 S.W.2d 279, 280 (Ky. 1962). See
Weddle,
supranote 35, at 662 (discussing the "public remedy" aspect of punitive damages)
132 Brown,

(citing Kimberly A. Pace, Recalibratingthe Scales of Justice Through National

Punitive Damages Reform, 46 AM. U. L. REv. 1573, 1579 (1997) ("[P]unitive
damages are meant to provide a public remedy for a public wrong rather than an
individual remedy.")).
"4Ludwig v. Johnson, 49 S.W.2d 347, 348 (Ky. 1932) (citations omitted).
13'
Fiscal Court of Jefferson County v. City of Louisville, 559 S.W.2d 478,481
(Ky. 1977) (quoting United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62 (1936)).
136
Commonwealth ex rel. Cowan v. Wilkinson, 828 S.W.2d 610, 614 (Ky.
1992). See alsoJohnson v. Commonwealth ex rel. Meredith, 165 S.W.2d 820,823
(Ky. 1942) (stating that the appropriateness of legislation is left to the body where
the Constitution places it, i.e., the General Assembly and not the courts).
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one as opposed to another. It is apparent that recent jural rights jurisprudence usurps the role of determining what cause of action is in the public
37
1
interest.
The expansive effect of the jural rights decision in Williams is tied to
criticisms of the doctrine itself. The court's expansion of the doctrine
seemed to reach its zenith with the case of Perkins v. NortheasternLog
Homes.'38 Perkins held that jural rights were not limited to those rights
which were present in 1891: "[T]he Kentucky Constitution must be applied
to fundamental jural rights as presently accepted in society, not frozen in
time to the year 18912"1 Such a broad reading ofjural rights is dangerous
because it gives courts the power to determine what rights are "presently
accepted in society," which is quintessentially a legislative function. The
Williams majority even acknowledged this "'constitutionalization' of
newly discovered rights" as "[p]erhaps the most controversial aspect of our
jural rights decisions."'"
An example of the expansive approach to the jural rights doctrine
resulting in the judicial branch making "legislative value-judgments" is the
1999 case of Gilbertv. Barkes.141 Gilbertresolved the issue of whether the
common law hybrid tort/contract cause of action based on breach of a
promise to marry should continue to exist in Kentucky. 42 Barkes sued
Gilbert, her ex-fiance, claiming detrimental reliance by taking an early
retirement and selling her house in expectation of their impending
marriage.143 The court recited the lengthy history of the cause of action, but
unlike in the punitive damages issue, there was no dispute as to whether the
cause of action was "firmly established" by 1891. 44 The court then
.37 See infra notes 141-167 and accompanying text.
3 Perkins v. Northeastern Log Homes, 808 S.W.2d 809, 809 (Ky. 1991).
39
' Id. at 817.
140
Williams, 972 S.W.2d at 268 (citing Perkins,808 S.W.2d at 816). The court
did not explicitly decide whether this "constitutionalization of newly discovered
rights" (as exemplified in Perkins) was still a part of the jural rights doctrine
because Williams involved jural rights that the majority found to be clearly
established in 1891. See id. However, the court indicated tacit disapproval of the
broadjural rights interpretation inPerkinsby stating that "[s]uch flaws as may have
crept into the theory [jural rights] arise from improper application and not from
fundamental misconception." Id. at 269.
141 Gilbert v. Barkes, 987 S.W.2d 772 (Ky. 1999).
42
' See id.
141
See id. at 773.
" See id.at 773-75 (outlining the extensive history of the cause of action, first
in England, then in Kentucky).
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proceeded to conclude that "the cause of action for breach of promise to
marry has become an anachronism that has out-lived its usefulness and
should be removed from the common law of the Commonwealth. 145 The
court referred to its power to abolish causes of action when they are found
to be "anomalous, unworkable, or contrary to public policy."'" The court
dismissed the argument that the General Assembly had "implicitly
adopted" the cause of action by placing a statute of limitations on it.147 The
majority acknowledged that the legislature "has the power to limit the time
in which a common law action can be brought,"' 4 8 but that doing so does
not indicate approval or disapproval of the claim.
Ironically, the court dismissed jural rights objections to removing the
cause of action from the common law:
While we are removing a cause of action from the common law, we
are not eradicating the ability of a party to seek a remedy for such a
wrong, but rather we are modifying the form that remedy may take.
Accordingly, our jural rights doctrine, enunciated in Ludwig v. Johnson,
49
is not implicated in this matter.1
The passage above is strikingly similar to the arguments put forth by the
losing party in Williams. The Gilbertmajority actually cited the dissenting
opinion in Williams for the proposition that "modification of a jural right
is permissible as long as the right itself is not abolished.' ' 50 The Gilbert
majority then concluded: "Since we have merely modified the means by
which certain wrongs may be remedied, we have no need to address the
jural rights doctrine."'' The majority sought to distinguish Williams by
claiming that the punitive damages statute "impaired" a fundamental right
by raising the standard of proof, whereas "abolishing" the breach of
promise to marry cause of action in Gilbert did not impair any right, but
"simply modified the methods" by which the right may be accessed.'5 2 The
meaning of the terms "abolish" and "impair" were given just the opposite
145
Id. at 776.

"4Id. (citing D & W Auto Supply v. Department of Revenue, 602 S.W.2d 420,
424. (Ky. 1980)).
'47 See id. at 775.
14
1 Id. at 776 (citing Saylor v. Hall, 497 S.W.2d 218, 223 (Ky. 1973)).
14
9

Id.

50

Id. (citing Williams v. Wilson, 972 S.W.2d 260, 271 (Ky. 1998) (Cooper, J.,
dissenting)) (citations omitted).
151Id.
152 Id.at 777-78.
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effect in Williams-therethe court held that the General Assembly could
not "impair" a right, because this impairment had the affect of abolishing
a right."' However, in Gilbert,it was constitutionally permissible for the
courtto abolish a right, because the abolition of the right did not impair the
right. Williams and Gilbert are, needless to say, quite difficult to reconcile.
After eliminating the breach of promise to marry cause of action from
the common law, the court then considered Barkes' claims under her
"modified" causes of action: breach of contract and intentional infliction
of emotional distress. Barkes was denied recovery on the contract claim
because her damages were not "direct wedding-related economic out-ofpocket expenses,"' 54 and there was no proof of final, serious intent to
marry. With regard to the emotional distress claim, the court held that
Barkes did not allege facts that could even begin to support a claim.'55
Although the Gilbertmajority sought to distinguish their holding from
that in Williams,'56 their actions in Gilbert did far more to "alter a firmly
established common law right" than did the actions of the General
Assembly in the punitive damages statute. The majority claimed that the
alternative remedies of breach of contract and intentional infliction of
emotional distress would preserve a plaintiff's ability to recover. 7
However, the elements and standard of proof for breach of contract and
intentional infliction of emotional distress are much more onerous on the
plaintiff than those for breach of promise to marry. To maintain an action
for a breach of promise to marry, there must be mutual promises to marry,
as well as offer and acceptance, but the offer need not be formal.' As far
as damages, the amount is not limited to what is recoverable in a typical
contract action for a breach of promise.5 9 These elements are crucial
because they show that under the breach of promise to marry cause of
action, Gilbertwould have met the elements at least for a prima facie case.
As the court pointed out, however, under the alternative remedies Gilbert

53

See Williams, 972 S.W.2d at 265-69.
Gilbert,987 S.W.2d at 777.
55
1 See id.
156 See id. at 776 n.3.
157
See id. at 776.
1 see id.
9See id.The court could award the plaintiff damages for anxiety of mind, loss
of time and money in preparation for marriage, loss of advantages which the
plaintiffmight have obtained from the marriage, etc. The damages available for the
old "breach of promise to marry" cause of action clearly go above and beyond
typical contract damages.
'

'5
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could not begin to establish a cause of action."6 This difference is
dispositive in showing that the court actually abolished the breach of
promise to marry cause of action. Under the common law elements, there
was no proof required of formal contractual standards, nor formal
contractual damages, because the cause of action was tort-related. The
Gilbertcourt proceeded to add these elements.'
The effect of Gilberton the breach of promise to marry cause of action
is far different than the effect of the punitive damages statute on the
common law right to punitive damages. The punitive damages statute
merely codified a standard for recovery that was already present at
common law: that of requiring some level of intent.' On the other hand,
Gilbert judicially substitutes two causes of action for the original common
law cause of action: the actions of breach of contract and intentional
infliction of emotional distress. 6 These alternative causes of action were
never a part of the breach of promise to marry action at common law. 63
A further example of the broad interpretation of the jural rights
doctrine which permits the court to make legislative-like policy is the 1999
decision in Shamrock CoalCo. v. Maricle 16 Shamrock is the court's latest
word on the subject, and the majority opinion wisely refuses to further
expand the reach of the jural rights doctrine. 6 The dissenting opinion,

11o
See id. at 776-77.
161 See supra notes 86-98.
16 See supra note 157.
163 See Gilbert,987 S.W.2d at 778 (Cooper, J., dissenting) ("That language [in
the majority opinion stating that the cause of action for breach of promise to marry
is no longer valid before the courts of the Commonwealth] can lead to but one
conclusion: the cause of action for breach of promise to marry has thereby been
abolished.").
'"Shamrock Coal Co. v. Maricle, 5 S.W.3d 130 (Ky. 1999). In this suit, former
workers of the Shamrock Coal Company sued their former employer for
compensation for work-related pneumoconiosis. The plaintiffs were laid off 30
days after the General Assembly modified the Workers' Compensation Act to
remove coverage for their particular level of disease (category 1pneumoconiosis).
Before the legislative change, the plaintiffs' illness would have been covered under
the statute. See id. at 132.
16'
The majority opinion cites the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers'
Compensation Act and points out that the plaintiffs' "right to occupational disease
benefits is purely statutory in nature." Id. at 134. Thus, it does not fall within the
jural rights provision because there was no such cause of action in existence in
1891. See id. at 134. Therefore, the plaintiffs are precluded from bringing suit in
circuit court. See id. at 133.
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however, reveals the true conception ofjural rights jurisprudence for those
who subscribe to the broad view of the doctrine. It argues that the jural
rights doctrine is a constitutional basis for the Kentucky Supreme Court to
prevent "violence to justice and fundamental fairness" caused by permitting
plaintiffs to be "stripped of their constitutionaljural rights to pursue a cause
of action for damages."" According to the dissent, "common sense"
determines whether violence to justice and fundamental fairness has
occurred. 67 Of course, this "common sense" is that of the justices, and not
that of the General Assembly. The jural rights doctrine is a constitutional
sword by which the court can do individual justice based upon its
conception of which outcome is dictated by common sense.
To analogize to federal due process, the Shamrock dissent's broad
conception of the jural rights doctrine is strikingly similar to the muchcriticized and now overturned "Lochnerdoctrine."' 68 The Lochner doctrine
allowed the Supreme Court to substitute its judgment about appropriate
economic laws for that of the legislative branch, under the guise of the
Fourteenth Amendment's freedom of contract provision. 69 The Lochner
66

Id. at 136 (Graves, J., dissenting). Among other things, the plaintiffs in this
case "alleged that Shamrock 'intentionally violated' safety procedures." Id at 132.
It is difficult to argue with the proposition that it is unfair for plaintiffs to be
stripped
of their day in court to seek compensation for their work-related injuries.
,67 Id. at 136 (Graves, J., dissenting). However, the "big picture" of separation
of powers demands that each branch of government stay within its proper
constitutional sphere. See supra note 133 and accompanying text This author
believes the use of the highly subjective notion of "common sense" as a talisman
for constitutional interpretation results in disparate outcomes; Williams, Gilbert,
and the Shamrock dissent all use the jural rights doctrine to satisfy a particular
sense of "individual justice" for individual litigants, but this "do the right thing,"
results-oriented jurisprudence is difficult to rationalize in our system based upon
stare decisis.
168 See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905). The Supreme Court
declared a New York maximum working hours law for bakers unconstitutional as
an impairment of the freedom of contract provision of the Fourteenth Amendment.
See id. at 64. This decision characterizes the "Lochner-era,"where the Supreme
Court routinely overturned economic laws based upon the Court's conception that
the express term "hberty' in the Fourteenth Amendment included freedom of
contract per laissez-faire economics. See generally ERwN CHEMERINsKY,
CONsTITuTIoNAL LAW: PRINcIPLEs AND POLICIEs 480 (1997).
169 The demise of the Lochner doctrine was based upon a realization that the
Supreme Court's support for a particular brand of economic policy (laissez-faire
economics, where the "fittest" were supposed to survive) had no place in
expounding upon the Constitution. Justice Holmes commented that, "[t]he
Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics ....
1
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doctrine was overturned in the 1930s (ironically, in the same decade in
which the Kentucky Supreme Court announced thejural rights doctrine).'
Justice Holmes foreshadowed the later demise of the Lochner doctrine in
his Lochner dissent: "[M]y agreement or disagreement [with the legislature's economic theory] has nothing to do with the right of a majority to
embody their opinions in law."'' Those on the Kentucky Supreme Court
who favor the broad jural rights doctrine seem to view it asjustification for
reaching the "common sense" decision. However, the fact that the plaintiff
in Gilbertwas denied her day in court, for a claim that the common law had
allowed, did not appeal to the supreme court's sense of injustice. Such
disparities in the meting out of justice call for a ruling by the Kentucky
Supreme Court discrediting this discretionary, Lochner-like approach as
plain judicial activism.
In sum, under current jural rights jurisprudence, the Kentucky Supreme
Court can alter or abolish a right based upon its conception of whether the
cause of action "command[s] the allegiance of the Citizens of the
Commonwealth."' 2 The court has this power in order to "keep the
[A] Constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic theory, whether
of paternalism and the organic relation of the citizen to the State or of laissez
faire." Id. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
170 Ludwig v. Johnson, 49 S.W.2d 347 (Ky. 1932), announced the jural rights
doctrine. In 1937, West CoastHotelv. Parrish,300 U.S. 379 (1937), signaled the
end of the Lochner-era.
71
' Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting). Parrishadmitted that the
Lochner-erajudicialactivism went beyond constitutional principles: "What is this
freedom? The Constitution does not speak of freedom of contract. It speaks of
liberty and prohibits the deprivation of liberty without due process of law."
Parrish,300 U.S. at 391. Likewise, the Kentucky Constitution does not speak of
the duty or right of the supreme court to police the common law of tort based upon
its "common-sense notions" of which laws make "common sense." The Kentucky
Constitution speaks only of open courts and limitations on damages. See KY.
CoNsT. §§ 14, 54, and 241.
172 Gilbert, 987 S.W.2d at 777. It appears that Justice Cooper's fears in the
Williams dissent have come to fruition-the jural rights doctrine is applied by the
court as a sword against legislative acts with which the court disagrees, but this
sword is never used to check the power of the body wielding it. Justice Cooper
posited, "Surely, the majority of this Court does not believe that the Constitution
applies only to the legislature and not to us." Williams v. Wilson, 972 S.W.2d 260,
274 (Ky. 1998) (Cooper, J., dissenting) (considering the scope of jural rights
jurisprudence and arguing that under the Williams majority's logic, the Kentucky
Supreme Court itself acted unconstitutionally in abolishing the common law tort
of alienation of affections in Hoye v. Hoye, 824 S.W.2d 422 (1992)). Now, under
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Common Law of Kentucky in step with its citizens." 73 However, the
General Assembly is not permitted even to codify into law elements of
punitive damages which already existed at common law in order to clarify
standards of recovery. As Professor Lewis predicted in 1992, "[u]nder the
court's current interpretation of the open courts provisions, tort principles
will be whatever the court decides they shall be; the merits or demerits of
efforts by the General Assembly to modify those principles are irrelevant
because it has no voice in the matter." 74 The 1999 Gilbertcase adds to the
jural rights list the quasi-contract/tort action of breach of promise to marry.
The evidence is clear that workable limits must be developed. The
uncertainty surrounding the scope of the jural rights doctrine has even led
to a 1999 challenge to Kentucky's entire system of Workers' Compensation, based on the Williams precedent.' 5 Workable limits, appropriate to
the separation of powers doctrine, need to be developed before the
remainder of Kentucky's punitive damages statute falls victim to the
dangerous and unpredictable jural rights sword.
IV. THE "CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE" STANDARD
AND APPLICATION OF A RESTRAINED JURAL RIGHTS DOCTRINE
A. Supportfor the Clearand ConvincingEvidence Standard
The "clear and convincing evidence" standard in the punitive damages
statute is an effort by the General Assembly to establish a "middle ground

the Williams logic, the court again acted unconstitutionally in abolishing the
common law tort of breach of promise to marry in Gilbert v. Barkes.
3 Gilbert, 987 S.W.2d at 777.
14 Lewis, supra note 8, at 963. See also Gilbert,987 S.W.2d at 778 (Cooper,
J., dissenting). Justice Cooper points out the inconsistency with which the court
applies the jural rights doctrine: "[I]f a pre-1891 cause of action is cloaked with
constitutional protection, it is protected as well from an act of this Court as it is
from an act of the legislature." Id. (Cooper, J., dissenting) (citing Williams, 972
S.W.2d at 274).
75
See McClain v. Dana Corp., No. 1998-CA-00283 1-MR, 1999 WL 819638
(Ky. Ct. App., Oct. 15, 1999). Although this challenge was unsuccessful, the
opinion is not final. The uncertainty of the jural rights doctrine is addressed in
Gilbert, 987 S.W.2d at 778 (Cooper, J., dissenting) (stating that some proponents
of the jural rights doctrine assert that it only applies to causes of action for injuries
causing death or due to negligence). However, Justice Cooper argues that Williams
outlines abroader construction of the doctrine, making punitive damages, intended
to punish and deter wrongdoing, ajural right. See id.
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between the standard ordinarily used in civil cases of proof by a 'preponderance of the evidence,' and the criminal law standard of proof 'beyond
a reasonable doubt."'"76 The "clear and convincing evidence" standard has
been adopted by a majority of states. ' This standard has been touted as a
way to "help reduce the number of frivolous claims" while retaining the
plaintiffs right to punitive damages when he "produce[s] substantial
evidence of outrageous behavior."1 8 The same clear and convincing
evidence standard is also authorized by the American College of Trial
Lawyers and the American Law Institute Reporter's Study on Enterprise
Responsibility for Personal Injury. 79 In fact, the Supreme Court has also
favorably acknowledged the clear and convincing evidence standard of
proof for punitive damages cases. 8 '
To be sure, the above authority is evidence that the Kentucky General
Assembly was on firm ground in establishing the clear and convincing
evidence standard in the punitive damages statute. In addition, the clear and
convincing evidence standard has been asserted as a way for courts to
provide stronger procedural protection for defendants (preventing arbitrary
juror action) without turning appeals courts into "super-juries" which
reverse jury decisions because they disagree with the outcome.' 8 ' As

Williams, 972 S.W.2d at 271 (Cooper, J., dissenting).
'7See id.See, e.g., Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 601 A.2d 633,655-56 (Md.
176

1992); Rodriguez v. Suzuki Motor Corp., 936 S.W.2d 104, 110 (Mo. 1996);
Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 294 N.W.2d 437, 458 (Wis. 1980) (noting that even
if the jury finds that the plaintiff proves her case by the clear and convincing
evidence standard, the jury still is not requiredto award punitive damages).
' Brett McComb Wall, Sympathyfor the Devil: How the Ohio TortReform Act
Creates a Flawed System of Punitive Damages, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1023, 1052
(1997).
179See AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAwYERs, REPORT ON PUNITIvE DAMAGES OF THE COMMITTEE ON SPECIAL PROBLEMS IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF

JUSTICE 15-16 (1989); AMERICAN LAw INST., 2 REPORTERS' STUDY, ENTERPRISE
RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY: APPROACHES TO LEGAL AND INSTI-

TUTIONAL
CHANGE 249
80

(1991).

' See Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23 n. 11 (1991).
81See Sajevic, supra note 24, at 551 ("The Court should impose stronger pro-

cedural protections for defendants and constrain its substantive due process

analysis to a proper concrete basis. Stronger procedural protections will limit juror
discretion at the most appropriate time: before the jury makes its award.").
Excessive second-guessing of the jury in the name of the Fourteenth Amendment
is parallel to the undesirable Lochner doctrine, just as the Kentucky Supreme
Court's application of the jural rights doctrine to second-guess the General
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previously mentioned, the court in Williams did not reach the question of
whether the clear and convincing evidence standard also violated the jural
rights doctrine."' Therefore, the view of the Kentucky Supreme Court on
this issue is largely an open question. The Kentucky Supreme Court has
previously given latitude to the General Assembly to modify the burden of
pro of for establishing a cause of action. Clark'sAdministratrixv. Louisville
& Nashville Railroad,'83 held that "the general assembly can change or
designate the 'degree' for which it may authorize a recovery of punitive
damages."'' However, whether altering a burden of proof (in the same
fashion as "impairing" a cause of action) effectively destroys a cause of
action is a question that can only be answered by determining the future
direction ofjural rights jurisprudence.
B. JuralRights Reforms for the Future
It is obvious that the current state of uncertainty surrounding the "clear
and convincing evidence" portion of the punitive damages statute prevents
both plaintiffs and defendants from forming reliable expectations regarding
the nature of the proof required for an award of punitive damages. 85 The
current uncertainty harms plaintiffs because the lack of clarity in jury
instructions (under the common law) raises the potential for a Fourteenth
Amendment challenge to any award obtained.'86 Of course, under the
common law approach, the defendant is faced with the prospect of quasicriminal punishment based upon a jury's discretionary determination of
what is "grossly negligent" behavior. 87 Allowing such punishment of a
defendant without the most clear and convincing evidence epitomizes the
"devastating potential for harm" from punitive damages which concerned
Assembly in Lochner-like fashion is undesirable.
' See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
183
Clark's Adm'x v. Louisville & Nashville R.R, 39 S.W. 840 (Ky. 1897).
18 4 Id. at 841.
185 The punitive damages statute was advantageous for plaintiffs as well as
defendants. Keeping the remaining part of the punitive damages statute will
likewise benefit both plaintiffs and defendants. The United States Court ofAppeals
for the Sixth Circuit has stated that the statute, in comparison with the common
law, "eased the standard aplaintiffmust meet to have the issue of punitive damages
submitted to ajury." Miller's Bottled Gas, Inc. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 56 F.3d 726,
733 (6th Cir. 1994). This case offers a useful comparison of the punitive damages
standards under the statute and under the prior common law.
186See supra notes 37-41.
87
" See supra notes 119-121.
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Justice O'Connor in Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip.8
Therefore, a modification of Kentucky's jural rights scrutiny is in order to
allow the clear and convincing evidence standard to remain, thereby
benefitting plaintiffs by largely alleviating Fourteenth Amendment
challenges to punitive damages awards. This modification would also
benefit defendants by making it tougher for juries to award punitive
damages on a whim.
However, abandoning thejural rights doctrine in its entirety is probably
not a feasible solution.8 9 The most modest reform would be for the
Kentucky Supreme Court to return to a modified version of their 1982
90
conception of the jural rights doctrine, as outlined in Carney v. Moody.
Carney exemplifies the narrow view of the jural rights doctrine, an
approach which examines whether the specific facts of a plaintiffs'
complaint would give rise to a legal cause of action when the constitution
was adopted in 1891.191' Adopting this narrow approach would preclude the
,88 Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 41 (1991) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
9
..
The jural rights doctrine does provide a useful basis for Kentucky courts to
scrutinize legislation on state constitutional grounds when the legislation does not
fit within a "classification" calling for special legislation scrutiny. See KY. CONST.
§ 59. Moreover, the jural rights doctrine has been a fixture of Kentucky
constitutional law (at least in some form) since Ludwig v. Johnson in 1932. Courts
are naturally concerned with the effect that a dramatic reversal of current
constitutional interpretation will have on the court's credibility. Justice O'Connor
addressed this concern in 1992 when the Supreme Court was considering
overturning the then-19-year-old precedent ofRoe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
See PlannedParenthood ofSoutheasternPennsylvaniav. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 86467 (1992). Justice O'Connor pointed out that in order to overrule a monumental
and workable precedent, there must be "some special reason over and above the
belief that a prior case was wrongly decided." Id. at 864. She also commented that
"to overrule under fire in the absence of the most compelling reason to reexamine
a watershed decision would subvert the Court's legitimacy beyond any serious
question." Id. at 867.
9oCarney
v. Moody, 646 S.W.2d 40,41 (Ky. 1982), appealafter remandsub
nom. Prudential Life Ins. Co. v. Moody, 696 S.W.2d 503 (Ky. 1985), overruledby
Perkins v. Northeastern Log Homes, 808 S.W.2d 809 (Ky. 1991). See also supra
note 69.
191 Carney, 646 S.W.2d at 41. This case refused to extend the jural rights
doctrine to protect rights presently accepted in society, but not accepted in 1891.
The court further rejected the contention that all negligence-based actions were
protected because negligence itself was established by 1891, concluding that such
"an equation between jural rights and an evolving common law.., would lead to
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type of broad, policy-laden constructions ofthejural rights doctrine that the
dissent in Shamrockpropounded.11 This approach acknowledges that while
"statutes... may occasionally leave injured parties without a remedy, or
without a solvent defendant," this circumstance "cannot justify the courts
in taking corrective measures that more appropriately fall within the
prerogative of the legislature,"' 93 With a narrow construction of the
doctrine, justices would not be permitted to decide which causes of action
were worthy of keeping. The supreme court would merely conduct an
historical inquiry to discover if the cause of action was firmly established
in 1891.
The obvious drawback to this narrow Carney approach is that it is
largely the same approach used in Williams. This approach still permits
the justices to wield the jural rights doctrine as a policy-making sword by
using their discretion to determine whether a cause of action was indeed
"firmly established" in 1891. A stronger, more deferential approach is
needed, especially since the court has already discarded the Carney
holding.
An examination of the approach taken by other states with constitutional provisions similar to the jural rights doctrine indicates that a slight
change in the Kentucky Supreme Court's application would provide an
approach more in line with separation of powers principles and less
conducive to judicial policy determinations. Thirty-nine states have
constitutional provisions similar to Kentucky'sjural rights provision which
serve to protect "an individual's right to a legal remedy."'' " The states
basically agree that their remedy provisions protect the plaintiff's common
law cause of action from infingement by the legislature after it has
accrued. 9 This interpretation is truly narrow given the power Kentucky's
provision has been interpreted to possess. Other courts, such as those in
Vermont, limit their "jural rights" provision to preventing courts from

the unacceptable result that 'every enlargement in... liability for negligent
conduct ...would assume constitutional status."' Lewis, supra note 8, at 958
(quoting Carney, 646 S.W.2d at 41).
92
See supranotes 164-167 and accompanying text.
93Carney,646 S.W.2d at 41.
194Shannon M. Roesler, The KansasRemedyByDue CourseofLaw
Provision:
Defininga Right to a Remedy, 47 U. KAN. L. REV. 655, 655 (1999) (citing David
Schuman, The Right to a Remedy, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 1197, 1201 n.25 (1992)).
See id. at 660 (citing Harrison v. Schrader, 569 S.W.2d 822, 827 (Tenn.
1978) (quoting Barnes v. Kyle, 306 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Tenn. 1957)); Schuman, supra
note 194, at 1206-08.
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denying a remedy for a cause of action created by the legislature.' 96 The
Vermont approach is consistent with the historic purpose of a remedylimiting provision: to protect the judiciary from corrupt influences. 97
Although the Kentucky courts have recognized a distinct purpose for the
jural rights doctrine ofpreventing legislative corruption, this purpose seems
already to be provided for in the Kentucky Constitution with the "special
legislation" provision. 98 However, Kentucky has recently construed the
jural rights doctrine as limiting legislative, not judicial, power. 199 States
have sought to offset the legislative power of the remedy-limiting provision
by requiring the legislature to supply "an adequate substitute remedy" 0
when it eliminates or restricts a cause of action. This interpretation would
have made sense with the Kentucky punitive damages statute, as the
subjective intent requirement adopted by the General Assembly was
already consistent with Kentucky case law. However, the Kentucky
Supreme Court has adopted a modified version of the alternative remedy
approach consistent with the awesome power enjoyed by the court in the
jural rights area: the supreme court, not the legislature, decides when an
196 See Roesler, supranote

194, at 661 (citing Quesnel v. Town of Middlebury,
706 A.2d 436, 439 (Vt. 1997)) (holding that Vermont's remedy provision merely
"guarantees access to the courts" for as long as the legislature has not repealed the
cause of action).
'97 See id. at 658-59.
' 9' See supranote 124. The Vermont approach is tacitly given credence by the
Kentucky Supreme Court in McCollum v. Sisters of Charity ofNazareth Health
Corp., 799 S.W.2d 15, 18 (Ky. 1990) ("[Section 14] has been held to apply to the
legislative branch of government as well as to the judicial branch.") (citing
Commonwealth v. Weiner, 280 S.W.2d 214 (Ky. 1955)).
',This emphasis on checking legislative power is obvious from the examples
of Wilson, Gilbert, and Shamrock, discussed earlier. But see Lewis, supra note
8, at 967 (quoting Johnson v. Higgins, 60 Ky. (3 Met.) 566, 570-71 (1861)).
Lewis noted that mid-nineteenth century Kentucky courts construed the jural
rights doctrine as merely a "checek" on the judicial department and not the
legislature:
The terms and import of this provision [§ 14] show that it relates altogether
to the judicial department... which is to administer justice "by due course
of law," and not to the legislative department....
...Any other construction would make it inconsistent with other
clauses of the constitution, and, in fact, render it practically absurd.
Id. 2
10 Bonin v. Vannaman, 929 P.2d 754, 768 (Kan. 1996).
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alternative remedy is appropriate and the substance of that remedy.2 01 The
above interpretation, although perhaps consistent with the intent of the
framers of the constitution, is unlikely to be accepted now due to the nearly
seventy years of stare decisis following Ludwig.
The most likely alternative which Kentucky could use to make thejural
rights doctrine more in step with separation of power principles involves
a familiar balancing test. This is the most workable solution to shift the
power and responsibility back to the General Assembly to determine proper
public policy through tort law. This approach has long been used in federal
due process law and allows for appropriate deference to legislative
judgments without abandoning the court's power to find an enactment
unconstitutional if it infringes on constitutional rights. 02 For example, this
approach has been adopted in Illinois: "[T]he General Assembly may alter
the common law and change or limit available remedies . . . . The
legislature is not free to enact changes to the common law which are not
rationally related to a legitimate government interest."2 3 Illinois courts
further require that legislative enactments by the General Assembly be
"dependent upon the nature and scope of the particular change in the
law. ' 2°4 The Illinois Supreme Court struck down the limit which had been
placed on compensatory damages for noneconomic losses, finding the
2 5
legislature's enactment "arbitrary" under this approach.
Constitutional balancing tests have often been criticized as unpredictable. 0 6 Currently, there is no explicit balancing done by the Kentucky
Supreme Court injural rights jurisprudence. The outcome is based upon an
articulated judicial judgment of whether the right was "firmly established"

See Gilbert v. Barkes, 987 S.W.2d 772, 775-76. (Ky. 1999).
G. Sidney Buchanan, A VeryRational Court,30 Hous. L.REv.
1509 (1993) (tracing the history ofthe rational basis and strict scrutiny tests applied
by the Supreme Court).
203 Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1077 (Ill. 1997) (citation
omitted).
201

2"2See generally

204 Id.
20 5
See id.

See Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enter., Inc. 486 U.S. 888, 897
(1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (criticizing the interstate commerce balancing test
as a task for Congress and "ill-suited for the judicial function," but approving
balancing judgments in determining "how far the needs of the State can intrude
upon the liberties of the individual"). But cf Thomas C. Marks, Jr., Three Ring
CircusSix Years Later,25 STETSON L. REV. 81 (1995) (concluding that balancing
of interests is generally a valid judicial approach).
206
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law.2 7 As

at common
Gilbertindicates, the results of the test are explicitly
based on a judicial interpretation of which causes of action merit
retention.20 8 This interpretation is largely discretionary. Therefore, a
balancing test would, at the least, add factors for the court to consider and,
at the worst, add no more discretion than that already present.
Under a strict scrutiny model the legislature must show that the change
is due to "overpowering public necessity" or that the change allows for a
"reasonable alternative" to the one repealed. 9 The current Kentucky
approach can fairly be characterized as ultrastrict. The approach in
Kentucky has evolved into a one-part "value judgment test" which assumes
that if the legislature (not the court) is modifying a remedy, and the court
approves of the original remedy, then the plaintiff has a fundamental right
to the original remedy. A better approach both tests whether the right is
"fundamental" (i.e., was firmly entrenched at the time the constitution was
enacted) and then balances it against whether the legislature had an
important basis for the change and whether the change was reasonable.
Texas adopted this intermediate approach in Sax v. T.P. Votteler.1 0 The
Texas Constitution has a very similar "open courts" provision to the
Kentucky version. Article I, section 13 of the Texas Constitution provides:
"All courts shall be open, and every person for an injury done him, in his
lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of
law."" The Sax court wisely construed this as "plainly, a due process
guarantee,"2 2 and like the Kentucky court in Ludwig, began its analysis
with a presumption that the legislature had not acted arbitrarily or
unreasonably. Sax was a challenge to the removal of a tolling provision for
minors' medical malpractice claims as a violation of the Texas open courts
provision.21 3 The Texas courts began construing this provision to ensure
that plaintiffs would "not unreasonably be denied access to the courts" in
1932, the same time as the Ludwig decision." 4 The test is described as:
2"7 See supra note
208
See Gilbert,

58 and accompanying text.

987 S.W.2d at 776.

See Wang, supra note 66, at 208 (noting the strict scrutiny approach of the
Florida Supreme Court, as demonstratedbyKlugerv. White, 281 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1973)).
20 Sax v. T.P. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1983). New Hampshire also
applies intermediate scrutiny to legislative changes in plaintiffs' rights to recover
for personal
injuries. See Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825, 830-31 (N.H. 1980).
211
209

TEX. CONST. art. I,

§ 3.

648 S.W.2d at 664.
See id. at 663-64.
214 See id. (citing Hanks v. City of Port Arthur, 48 S.W.2d 944, 945 (Tex.
1932)).
212 Sax,
213
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[L]egislative action withdrawing common-law remedies for well
established common-law causes of action for injuries to one's "lands,
goods, person or repuation" is sustained only when it is reasonable in
substituting other remedies, or when it is a reasonable exercise of the
police power in the interest of the general welfare. Legislative action of
this type is not sustained when it is arbitrary or unreasonable.2 15
The Sax court stressed that in applying this balancing test, it considers
"the general purpose of the statute and the extent to which the litigant's
right to redress is affected. ' 216 Step two involves a two-part burden on the
plaintiff: proof that a well-settled cause of action is being curtailed, and
that the restriction is "unreasonable or arbitrary." 1 7 In applying this test,
the Sax court first determined that the legislative intent for removing the
tolling provision was to limit the potential liability period of health care
providers. This, in turn, would reduce the cost of medical malpractice
insurance, so that providers could obtain insurance to compensate
legitimate malpractice claims."1 Next, the court found that the minor
plaintiff had a well-established right to sue for negligence; however, the
211 1d. at 665

1955)).
21

6Id.at

(quoting Lebohmv. City of Galveston, 275 S.W.2d 951,955 (Tex.

666.

217Id. Professor Lewis

also points out the safeguards other than the jural rights
doctrine available to the court to use in declaring a law unconstitutional: "Of
course, a given legislative modification of the common law of torts might be
'special legislation,' or a violation of equal protection, state or federal, or an
exercise of arbitrarypower." Lewis, supra note 8, at 976 (emphasis added).
Intermediate review is in no way an abdication by the courts ofjudicial authority
to the legislative branch. Even rational basis review has "bite" when the legislation
is arbitrary or discriminatory. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631-32
(1996) (holding that animus toward a particular group failed rational basis as
unreasonable); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869 (1985) (finding
that economic discrimination against out-of-state insurance companies, as
evidenced by lower taxes for in-state insurance companies, failed rational basis as
discriminatory and unreasonable). To be sure, the Kentucky courts could strike
down any law deemed to be discriminatory or arbitrary. In addition, the
intermediate scrutiny approach generally does not "hypothesize" an important
government interest; the legislature has to proffer one. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190, 200 (1976) (rejecting state statistics offered as justification for
allowing 18 year old women but not 18 year old men to purchase low-alcohol
beer; the Court found the legislative intent substantially unrelated to an important
goal).
218

See Sax, 648 S.W.2d at 666.
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cause of action normally belongs to the parent.2" 9 The court then determined that the statute, by relying on parents to sue on the minor's behalf,
was unreasonable when balanced against the fact that the minor was
"forever precluded from having her day in court" if her parents were
"ignorant, lethargic, or lack[ed] concern ' and failed to bring the suit
within the prescribed time.
The intermediate balancing test allows for a middle ground between
protecting the jural rights of plaintiffs and the Fourteenth Amendment
rights of defendants. This intermediate balancing test is appropriate for
Kentucky because it still allows the courts some discretion to determine
what is reasonable or arbitrary. However, the burden is placed on the
plaintiff to make this showing. For example, applied to the Williams case,
the step one outcome of determining legislative intent would be that of
"providing more certainty to the standards of recovery." Under step two,
if the court concluded that the right was not "well-established" at common
law, the analysis would end; the legislation would be upheld by pointing to
a rational basis. However, the court would probably conclude again that the
plaintiffhad a "well-established right" to recover for gross negligence. This
conclusion would necessitate a balancing under the intermediate scrutiny
test. This balancing should lead to the conclusion that the codification of
conscious awareness was not unreasonable or arbitrary, and that the
legislature had an important goal in enacting the statute: to promote
certainty and to avoid Fourteenth Amendment problems. This finding
would be mandated because the alternative remedy of inferring intent was
already in place at common law. Moreover, under the intermediate scrutiny
scheme, the court's approval would be aided by the fact that the plaintiff
in Williams would still have the burden of showing that the punitive
damages statute was unreasonable or arbitrary. However, the court would
not hypothesize a legitimate legislative goal; the legislature would have to
provide one. It is important to note that if the Williams court, under the
intermediate scrutiny test in step one, determined that some favoritism to
special interests underlay the legislative intent, or found that the punitive
damages statute precluded a plaintiff from having her day in court, the
statute could then be declared unreasonable.221
219

See id.

220 Id. at 667.
22 See supranote

217. It is importantto note, however, thatunder this proposed
version of intermediate scrutiny, the state's burden of proof for showing an
important reason would be a preponderance of the evidence. Cf United States v.
Virginia., 518 U.S. 515, 531, 533 (1996) (holding that the federal intermediate
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CONCLUSION

The punitive damages statute is a modest Kentucky contribution to a
larger national movement for tort reform. The common law standard of
recovery for punitive damages was largely discretionary, as demonstrated
not only by varying terminology, but also by the substantive disparity of
allowing recovery both for objective gross negligence and the more
subjective conscious awareness requirement. The General Assembly had
the legitimate legislative goal of clarifying the ambiguous standards, to
heed the warning of the Supreme Court not to run afoul of the Fourteenth
Amendment "taking" prohibition.
Williams v. Wilson expanded the reach of the jural rights doctrine to
strike down the conscious awareness aspect of the punitive damages
statute. The Williams court perceived that the statute mandated an
inequitable result for the plaintiffs when the defendant was not available to
prove subjective intent. However, subjective intent has traditionally been
inferred from facts and circumstances. The Williams "fair-result"-oriented
constitutional approach is characteristic of the policy-laden jural rights
doctrine. This approach, whereby the Kentucky Supreme Court is the
exclusive arbiter of Kentucky tort law, raises serious separation of powers
concerns. Far-reaching matters of public policy, including the wisdom and
propriety of legislation, are clearly and properly within the realm of the
General Assembly.
The uncertainty and unpredictability stemming from the jural rights
doctrine demands a shift to a more restrained review. A more restrained
approach would save the "clear and convincing evidence" reform of the
punitive damages statute from jural rights attack. In turn, the clear and
convincing evidence standard can save the punitive damages scheme from
a Fourteenth Amendment attack. Both plaintiffs and defendants would
suffer if the clear and convincing evidence standard were declared
unconstitutional because such a ruling would increase Fourteenth Amendment challenges and remittiturs of plaintiff punitive awards. An intermediate scrutiny balancing test where the legislation enjoys a presumption of
constitutionality would provide the proper deference to the General
Assembly, yet still allow the courts to strike unreasonable or arbitrary
changes to jural rights.

scrutiny standardrequires the state to show "exceedinglypersuasivejustification").
The federal approach is more similar to the ultrastrict scrutiny approach currently
employed by the Kentucky courts.

